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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
TffiSTATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
DARREN D. EARL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 20066 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an interlocutory appeal by the State of Utah from 
an Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
presiding, granting the defendant-respondent's Motion to suppress 
certain items of evidence seized by a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
fran the defendant's motor vehicle. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Defendant-Respondent, Darren D. Earl, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Defendant" was arrested on May 4, 1984, by a Utah Highway 
Patrol Trooper and charged with the Third Degree Felony of possession 
of a controlled substance, marijuana, with the intent to distribute 
for value, contrary to Section 58-37-8 1(a) (ii) U.C.A. 1953 as airended. 
The defendant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District 
Court for arraignment after a preliminary hearing before the Justice 
of the Peace in and for Nephi Precinct, Juab County. After arraign-
ment before the District Court, the Defendant filed a Motion to 
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Suppress certain large bags of marijuana seized from the trunk of 
the Defendant's motor vehicle. A hearing was held before the 
District Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress on May 24, 
1984. After the hearing the State of Utah and the Defendant each 
submitted Memorandum of Law with respect to their positions. On 
June 14, 1984, the District Court entered its Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence, from which this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant-State of Utah seeks to have this Honorable Supreme 
Court reverse the Order of the lower Court granting the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, thereby permitting the admission of those 
certain items of evidence seized from the trunk of the defendant's 
motor vehicle at the trial of the defendant for violation of Utah's 
Controlled Substances Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Darren D. Earl, is charged with the Third Degree 
Felony Offense of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, 
with intent to distribute for value; contrary to Section 58-37-8 
I (a) (ii) U.C.A. 1953 as amended. The charge originates from 
an incident that occurred on May 4, 1984, within Juab County, Utah. 
During the afternoon of that day Trooper Paul V. Mangel son, 
an experienced seventeen year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol was 
northbound on Temporary 1-15 between Levan and Nephi. While traveling 
he observed a motor vehicle parked approximately one hundred fifty feet 
off the highway on a dirt road. The officer became suspicious of 
the vehicle in that it was parked in a flood area, and the occupant 
of the vehicle payed very close attention to the activities of the 
officer as he drove past him. The officer then observed the vehicle 
pull onto the highway. The officer then made a U-turn and pulled 
in behind the subject vehicle. The officer then followed the subject 
vehicle for a period of time, during which time the vehicle was 
only driven at a speed of 35 and 40 miles per hour, and did weave 
from side to side within its lane of traffic. Based upon these 
observations the officer pulled the subject vehicle over to the 
side of the road approximately four miles south of Nephi ( T-5,6 ) . 
Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the driver, 
who he identified as Darren D. Earl, from his Utah driver's license. 
The officer requested a registration for the vehicle from the defendant, 
since the defendant had a Utah driver's license and the vehicle had 
a Wisconsin plates on it. The. defendant was not able to produce-
a registration, and he indicated that he had leased the vehicle in Tuscon, 
Arizona, but he was also unable to produce a lease agreement for the 
vehicle. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany the 
officer to his car so that he could make further inquiry concerning 
the ownership of the vehicle on his radio. While in the officer's 
vehicle the defendant became very nervous and suddenly he jumped out of 
the officer's car and started for his vehicle. The officer then jumped 
out of his car and caught the defendant prior to his reaching his vehicle. 
He then placed him under custodial arrest for failure to produce a 
registration or proof of ownership for the vehicle, and handcuffed him and 
placed him back in the patrol car (T6-8 ) . 
Trooper Mangelson upon first coming in contact with the defendant 
had detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from the interior of the 
vehicle (T-6) . The officer inquired of the defendant concerning the 
smell and the defendant responded that there were a couple of joints 
of marijuana in the car, probably in a Levi jacket laying on the 
seat of the vehicle (T-7) . 
After returning the defendant to his patrol car and upon the 
arrival of a back-up officer, Sergeant Sterling Christensen, Trooper 
Mangelson returned to the defendant's vehicle and searched the interior 
of the passenger compartment, where he found a fully loaded pistol 
on the driver's side floorboard, a cellophane bag containing a white 
substance which in the opinion of Trooper Mangelson was cocaine, and 
paraphanelia for the use of cocaine. Trooper Mangelson did not 
find any marijuana in the passenger compartment of the vehicle bat did 
find seme strong air freshners (T8-9). 
After seizing the items in the defendant's vehicle, Trooper 
Mangelson returned to the patrol car and informed the defendant he 
was also being charged with possession of a loaded firearm in a 
vehicle and illegal possession of a controlled substance (T-10) . 
Since the defendant had been placed under custodial arrest the 
officers pursuant to Utah Highway Patrol policy requested a wrecker 
to tow the defendant's vehicle into Nephi for safekeeping. Prior 
to the vehicle being taken to the storage yard, it was towed to the 
Juab County Public Safety Building for a written inventory to be 
made of the contents of the vehicle (T 10,11) . 
It is written Utah Highway Patrol Policy for a written inventory 
to be made of the contents of any vehicle taken to any police parking 
lot, impound lot or to any commercial storage lot (R47,48) . Upon 
arrival at the Juab County Public Safety Building a written inventory 
of the contents of the defendant's vehicle was made (R 49) . Upon 
opening the trunk to the vehicle an extremely strong odor of marijuana 
was detected. Contained in the trunk were two green garbage bags tied at 
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the top and a brown leather duffel bag. Contained in the two 
green garbage bags was thirty-three pounds of packaged marijuana 
(T12,13 ) . 
Prior to conducting the inventory search the officers involved 
discussed the possibility of obtaining a Search War ant . When they 
determined that the county attorney and both Justices of the Peace, 
located in Nephi were out of town, at the time, they came to the con-
clusion that they would be following correct police and search procedure 
to conduct the inventory search as outlined in the written highway 
patrol policy and procedures (T27,28). 
The items contained in the trunk of the vehicle driven by the 
defendant were the subject of the defendant's Motion to Supress, which 
was granted by the lower court, and which is the basis for this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS LAWFUL, 
AND ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THAT SEARCH MAY BE USED AS EVIDENCE, 
AND THE LOWER COURTERRED IN SUPPRESSING THEM. 
The case before the Court deals with the warrantless inventory 
search of the trunk of a leased vehicle, after the custodial arrest 
of the defendant for failure to produce registration or proof of 
ownership for the vehicle, possession of a loaded firearm in a vehicle 
and illegal possession of a controlled substance, cocaine. The search 
resulted in the seizure of thirty-three pounds of packaged marajuana, 
contained in two plastic garbags bags, and the charging of the defendant 
with the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute for value. 
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This Court and other Courts across the country have consistently 
held that the same constitutional expectations of privacy as in a 
person's hone are not accorded an automobile because its use necessarily 
exposes it to great intrusion, therefore, a lesser expectation of 
privacy. 
The U.S. Supreme Court early recognized that because a motor vehicle 
may be capable of being moved before a warrant can be obtained, that 
special considerations must be applied in determining the validity 
of vehicle searches. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) . 
The Court in Carroll applied two general standards for dispensing 
with the need to obtain a warrant when probable cause was present. The 
first was the mobility of the vehicle and the second the iirpracticability 
of obtaining a Search Warrant under the circumstances. 
This Court has adopted the position that where a vehicle retains 
a reasonable degree of mobility, and there is probable cause to 
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, a 
search of the vehicle may be made without a warrant. See State v. Limb, 
581 P. 2d 142 (Utah-1978) and State v . Criscola 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 
517 (1968) . This Court has also approved the seizure of an automobile 
and its removal to the police station for a more convenient search 
Where the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle. See, 
State v Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d
 848 (1972). 
The U.S. Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) held that where police officers had probable 
cause to believe that a trunk of a vehicle contained narcotics the 
Carroll rule applied and the search of the trunk and subsequent search 
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of a zippered leather pouch in the trunk in which cash and narcotics were 
found was a lawful search, The Court concluded that an automobile 
search could go beyond the search and seizure of the vehicle and could 
include containers in the vehicle based on probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle contained contraband and that the container 
was capable of containing it. 
With respect to inventory searches, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
approved the seizure and admission into evidence of items found in 
plain view during a protective effort to secure a vehicle otherwise 
in police custody; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), 
ar
^
i
 Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) . Inventory searches 
after impound have also been upheld including closed containers; see 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
This Court has also upheld routine inventory searches of a 
vehicle which took place subsequent to the arrest of the driver; 
see State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2 n d 272, 444 P. 2 d 517 (1968) and State 
v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699 (Utah 1981) . This Court in Rcmero at page 701 
stated: " The law is well established that warrantless searches of 
impounded vehicles for the benign purpose of protecting the police 
and the public from danger, avoiding police liability for lost or 
stolen property, and protecting the owner's property, are permitted 
by the Fourth Amendment." 
Applying the above law to the facts of the present case, it is 
clear that the warrantless search of the defendant's trunk can be 
justified under two different principles. One being that from the 
facts present there was sufficient probable cause for Trooper Mangelson 
to search the trunk for marijuana • Mangelson had detected an extremely 
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strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, but no marijuana 
was found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, although air 
freshners were found as was a loaded firearm and a quantity of 
suspected cocaine. 
The subject vehicle was a rental car, which the defendant had 
rented after flying to Arizona from Utah, which was additional 
evidence to establish probable cause that the defendant was a drug 
courier. If the Court finds that Mangelson had sufficient probable 
cause, then he did not need a search warrant pursuant to the principals 
of the Carroll doctrine and the recent case of the U.S. v. Ross. 
He could also remove the vehicle to the Juab County Public 
Safety Building to provide a location for a more convenient search, 
pursuant to State v. Shields. 
The other lawful basis for the search was pursuant to the written 
policy and procedures of tie highway patrol to make inventory searches 
of all vehicles brought into the custody and control of the highway 
patrol after a custodial arrest. Similiar inventory searches have 
been upheld by this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in the cases 
cited herein above. 
The lower court therefore erred in granting defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, in that the warrantless search of the trunk of the defen-
dant's vehicle was not a violation of his constitutional rights under 
either the Utah or U.S. Constitution. 
POINT 2. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE SUBJECT EVIDENCE WAS UNLAW-
FULLY SEIZED, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT A 
SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMEM3MEHP RIGHTS 
AND THE POLICE OFFICERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
Section 78-16-5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended states: "No evidence 
which is otherwise competent and admissible shall be excluded from 
any criminal proceeding because of the violation of the Iburth 
Amendment rights, except evidence which, though otherwise admissible 
was secured in a method which involved a substantial violation of 
Iburth Amendment rights as provided in subsection 77-35-12 (g)". 
Subsection 77-35-12 (g) states: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the supp-
ression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court 
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The 
court shall set forth its reasons for such finding . 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all cases be deemed 
substantial if one or more of the following is established 
by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful, malicious, 
shocking to the conscience of the court or was a result 
of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant to a 
general order of that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass without legitimate 
law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting in good 
faith under this section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future 
violations of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a search 
warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on previous specific 
direction of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
Eefore the lower court should have suppressed and excluded the 
subject evidence it should have found both that there was a "substantial 
violation" of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and that the 
police officers did not act in "good faith" pursuant to the defination 
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of each of those terms in the above cited section of the Utah Code 
of Criminal Procedure. 
If the Court does for sane reason find there was a violation of 
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, that violation clearly does 
not come within the definition of a substantial violation. The search 
was made of a leased vehicle after the lawful custodial arrest of 
the defendant. The defendant could not have had a very high expect-
ation of privacy for the items contained in said trunk. There is 
evidence that any violation found was grossly negligent, willful, 
malicious or shocking to the conscience of the court. The search 
was the result of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant 
to to a general order, but such practice of inventory searches has 
been upheld numerous times by this Court. Further the search had 
a legitimate law enforcement purpose as set forth above and was not 
intended only to harass the defendant. 
The police officers were acting in good faith as defined by section 
77-35-12. They would have violated highway patrol policy if they 
had not had the vehicle towed into Nephi and had not made an 
inventory search of the vehicle. The initial arrest of the defendant 
was not a pretext to enable the search of the vehicle. Trooper 
Mangelson merely followed proper police investigative techniques, 
and it was the defendant's actions that placed him in a position where 
his vehicle could be lawfully searched. 
It is true that the officers considered obtaining a search 
warrant, but when it became apparent that they could not readily 
obtain one because the county attorney and both available justice of the 
-10-
peace were out of town, and the fact the defendant could readily 
bail out of jail on the misdemeanor charges and retrieve his 
vehicle, the officers correctly chose to conduct the constitutionally 
sound inventory search. 
The constitutionality of Section 78-16-5 has not been ruled 
upon by this Court. The principle upon which section is based, that 
of limiting the effect of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary to those 
cases where there has been a substantial violation of a person's 
Etwrth Amendment rights and the officers did not act in good fath, 
was recently upheld in the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States 
v. Leon, 82 L. Ed. 2 n d 677 (1984). In that case the Supreme Court 
held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the use by the prosecutor 
of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance, on 
a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but 
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. 
If the Court does find that there was a violation of the 
defendant's Eburth Amendment rights, any violation was not substantial, 
and the officers were acting in good faith. The lcwer court erred in 
finding a substantial violation and that the officers did not 
act in good faith. The decision of the lower court should be 
reversed and the subject evidence should not be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The search and seizure of the thirty-three pounds of marijuana 
from the defendant's vehicle did not violate the defendant's constitutional 
rights under either the Utah or United States Constitution. The 
warrantless search of the vehicle may be justified under the Carroll 
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doctrine, in that the officers had probable cause to search the trunk 
for marijuana. The warrantless search may also be justified as a 
proper police inventory search after the custodial arrest of the 
defendant. 
Even if the court finds a violation of the defendant's 
constitutional rights, any violation was not substantial and the 
officers acted in good faith by following the Utah Highway Patrol 
policies with respect to inventory searches. Therefore pursuant to 
Section 78-16-5 U.C.A. the evidence should not have been suppressed by 
the lower court. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court granting the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, and permit the introduction of the two plastic 
garbage bags containing the thirty-three pounds of marijuana as 
evidence. 
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